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THE ETHICS OF SUBJECTING  
A CHILD TO THE RISK OF ETERNAL TORMENT:  
A REPLY TO SHAWN BAWULSKI
Kenneth Einar Himma
In “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” I argue that it is morally wrong, given 
ordinary moral intuitions about child-bearing decisions together with the tra-
ditional Christian doctrines of hell and salvific exclusivism, to bring a child 
into the world when the probability that she will spend an eternal afterlife 
suffering the torments of hell is as high as it would be if these two doctrines 
are true. In a paper published by this journal, Shawn Bawulski responds to 
my arguments, offering a number of philosophical and theological objections 
to my arguments. In this essay, I reply to those objections and counter-
arguments.
Introduction
Although it is typically thought that, as a general matter, it is morally 
permissible for married couples to have children, I argue in “Birth as a 
Grave Misfortune”1 that this view is mistaken if two traditional doctrines 
of Christianity are true. The first of these views, Christian salvific exclu-
sivism (CSE), holds that it is a necessary condition for being spared divine 
punishment that one instantiate a genuinely saving Christian faith before 
one’s death. The second is the traditional doctrine of hell (TDH), which 
holds that (1) there are people consigned to hell; (2) hell is divine punish-
ment of unforgiven sin; and (3) hell is a state of eternal torment unmatched 
in severity by anything one can experience in this world.
My argument is grounded in a moral intuition I think most people 
share, namely, that it is wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into 
the world if they rationally believe there is a sufficiently high probability 
that the child will experience severe harm after birth that will endure 
throughout the child’s lifetime, which I call the New Life Principle (here-
inafter NLP). Suppose, for example, 99 percent of the reliable evidence 
available to would-be parents indicates that the child they contemplate 
conceiving would be born with a terminal illness causing constant pain so 
severe it cannot be alleviated by any known narcotics or even the comfort 
1Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 179–198. 
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of her would-be parents’ love.2 It seems wrong for the would-be parents to 
conceive at that point in time under these circumstances.
NLP seems to have some important implications with respect to whether 
it is, as a general matter, permissible to bring a new child into the world. 
Assuming TDH and CSE are true, the odds that any new child—bracketing 
any information about the conditions into which she will be born—will 
spend an eternal afterlife suffering the torments of hell are disturbingly 
high. Indeed, only one-third of the world’s nearly seven billion people 
claim to be Christians, effectively consigning the other two-thirds imme-
diately to hell for eternity, under CSE. But the intuition underlying NLP 
suggests it would also be wrong to bring a child into the world given the 
risk that she will be consigned to hell for not having the right beliefs. Thus, 
assuming TDH and CSE are true, it seems impermissible for would-be 
parents to bring a child into the world when the odds she will experience 
the torments of hell are as high as they would be if these two doctrines are 
true. This, of course, is inconsistent with the view, shared by Christians 
and non-Christians alike, that it is prima facie (or presumptively) permis-
sible to bring a child into the world (hereinafter, the “Having Kids is Good 
Principle” or HKG).3
It is important to be clear on what the conclusion is exactly. The conclu-
sion is not that it is morally wrong to have children. Rather, insofar as 
TDH, CSE, NLP, and HKG purport to be necessary truths (as truths about 
God and ethics) the conclusion is that the set containing these claims is 
logically inconsistent.4 The argument I gave, if sound, entails the rejection 
of NLP, TDH, CSE, or HKG. Although one can reject any of these claims, I 
think the most likely response discards CSE or TDH, and retains NLP and 
HKG, since the underlying intuitions for these latter principles will likely 
seem obvious and hence be held resolutely.
I. Objections and Replies: Theological Objections
Shawn Bawulski begins with a series of theologically grounded objec-
tions.5 His first objection challenges the intuitively grounded principle on 
which the argument rests—namely, NLP. As Bawulski puts the objection:
2This principle is intended to apply only to harms that are likely to persist throughout the 
child’s lifetime. If a predicted harm can be treated and healed through medical science, then 
the calculus—and relevant principle—changes.
3HKG should be construed as being rebuttable. Apart from the exceptions I discuss in 
this essay, I am agnostic with respect to what ordinary, earthly circumstances might rebut 
the presumption. One might think the impact on the environment of bringing a child into 
the world is relevant with respect to the application of HKG. I leave these matters to the 
intuitions of the reader.
4Assuming the relevant claims are contingent claims about this world, the fact that it is 
true in this world that there is a grave risk of damnation is enough to show that the relevant 
set of claims cannot all be true together.
5Bawulski, “Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 330–
344.
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Crucially lacking is any consideration for God’s activity; it seems that Him-
ma’s concept of procreation is theologically impoverished. From Ps. 127:3—
children are a gift from the Lord, and he is the giver of life. Himma states this 
initially in his essay, but it is strangely absent when he moves to discuss the 
morality of the decision to procreate, leaving his essay liable to the impres-
sion that only human agency is relevant. The view taken up in this objection 
says that God’s activity in procreation is paramount and is significant for the 
procreation decision. I do not autonomously create a new person; rather, 
God creates a new person in a way that involves my actions (reproduction).6
The claim here is that my analysis ignores a theologically grounded con-
ception of procreation as involving both human and divine agency.
There are a couple of preliminary observations that should be made in 
response to Bawulski’s remarks quoted above. First, although Bawulski 
begins the objection with a citation to Biblical verses implying HKG, there 
is no logical inconsistency between those claims and NLP, since NLP, by 
its own terms, precludes bringing a child into the world only under certain 
specified conditions. It might be true that bringing a child into the world 
is a gift from God, but it does not follow that it is absolutely permissible for 
two people to bring a child into the world. From the standpoint of ordi-
nary intuitions, it can be permissible to decline a gift that is morally good 
to offer. If, for example, Bill Gates kindly offers me a gift of $1,000,000, I 
have a moral permission to respectfully decline the gift (perhaps I feel 
uncomfortable accepting such a large sum of money). Intuitively, I do no 
wrong by declining Gates’s gift, but Gates does no wrong by offering it.
Indeed, the idea that there is an absolute prohibition on declining gifts is 
false on mainstream Christian views—even when the relevant gift is from 
God! First, Christianity puts a constraint on the gift of procreation: it is 
morally impermissible, according to mainstream Christianity, for unmar-
ried people to procreate; the theology of Christianity pretty clearly implies 
that the creation of a new child by God through the parents’ procreative 
act is not necessarily a gift that is permissible to accept. This means, as 
an interpretative matter, either children conceived out of wedlock are not 
gifts from God or they are gifts that are permissible to decline. Either way, 
there is no inconsistency between the claim that children are a gift from 
God and NLP’s more general presupposition that bringing a child into the 
world is wrong under certain specified conditions.
Second, it is reasonable to hypothesize that most Christians, including 
more conservative Christians who accept TDH and CSE, would, and 
with some validity, criticize two people who have children knowing they 
cannot support them financially and emotionally—even if those children 
are still plausibly regarded as “blessings” or “gifts.” It is both Biblical 
and intuitive that having children comes with certain obligations of sup-
port. It simply seems wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into the 
world when they know they cannot meet these support obligations. If this 
6Ibid., 336.
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is correct, then Bawulski hasn’t given any plausible reason to think that 
NLP conflicts, in any way fatal to my argument, with the idea that having 
children is a moral good or its implication, HKG.7
But Bawulski’s argument against NLP, despite citing a Biblical verse 
indicating that children are a gift from God, does not really rely on that 
claim, as far as I can see. The gravamen of Bawulski’s argument is, ulti-
mately, that NLP is problematic because it implies the doctrine of salvific 
universalism. Although there are Biblical verses supporting universalism,8 
many Christians likely reject universalism on the strength of an intuition 
that it is unfair to treat, under the guise of divine justice, those who repent 
of their sins and follow the will of God in the same way as those who have 
done neither.
The reason that Bawulski believes that NLP implies salvific universalism 
is that he believes NLP must apply to God as well, since God’s agency is 
also necessary to bring children into the world. For if NLP applies to God, 
then it seems God is obligated not to bring any children into the world 
that he knows will go to hell; this assumes, of course, that God knows both 
which children would be brought into the world and how they would 
act.9 If the doctrine of divine foreknowledge is true (and includes knowing 
both who will be born and what choices they will make in life), then there 
will be no one in hell, since God will abstain from bringing anyone into 
the world who would wind up there. And this, of course, implies salvific 
universalism.
Bawulski’s view that NLP must apply to God is vulnerable to objec-
tion—and one that, I believe, can be grounded in theologically informed 
intuitions widely shared among ordinary Christians. One common re-
sponse—at least among philosophical laypersons—to the theological 
problem of evil, which, by its own terms, poses a problem internal to 
Christianity requiring a reconciliation of suffering with mainstream 
Christian theology, is simply to take the position that “God works in mys-
terious ways.” This can be interpreted in two ways equally plausible from 
the standpoint of mainstream Christianity: (1) we are not in a position to 
understand how moral principles apply to God; or (2) a different set of 
moral principles from those applying to human beings apply to God.
7It should be noted that the moral value of having children is distinct from the moral 
value of a child’s life. The value of the latter would be regarded as intrinsic and sacred by 
traditional views, whereas the value of having children might also be intrinsic, but is more 
likely instrumental. In any event, HKG is concerned with the moral value of having chil-
dren—i.e., under what circumstances having children is morally permissible. I am grateful 
to an anonymous reviewer for making me aware of this concern.
8For example, I. Corinthians 15:22 states, “As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in 
Christ.” Similarly, according to Romans 5:18, “God has imprisoned all in disobedience, that 
He may be merciful to all.” Even more explicitly, I Timothy 2:4 teaches that “[i]t is the will of 
God our Savior that all should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.”
9On an open theist view, God would presumably have sufficient empirical information 
to make highly reliable predictions about both, falling short of knowledge, but consistently 
accurate enough to justify not bringing doomed children into the world.
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Either way, Bawulski’s view that my argument presupposes that NLP 
applies to God is problematic. There is nothing in my argument that sug-
gests that the moral principles that apply to human beings necessarily 
apply to God—even if we assume that Bawulski has provided sufficient 
support for his views concerning God’s active role in procreation. I do not 
have to take that position any more than Bawulski must as a Christian; I 
could take the position, as many mainstream Christians do, that if God 
exists, then a different set of moral principles govern his agency. Further, 
if, as is generally assumed by mainstream Christians, human beings are 
not in a sufficiently reliable epistemic position to assess God’s behavior 
under moral standards, Bawulski cannot claim that NLP, even assuming 
it applies to God, implies either salvific universalism or the claim that God 
cannot bring into the world people he knows will go to hell.
Even so, Bawulski is correct in targeting NLP as the first line of attack, 
as the argument clearly rests on an empirical prediction that the reader 
will share my reaction to the possible fact-patterns I consider. In this con-
nection, it is crucial to note that the claim that NLP expresses or conforms 
to an ordinary intuition is an empirical claim that requires sociological 
support of some kind; the claim that an intuition is “ordinary” simply 
expresses the claim that most people share it.
Despite this fact, no empirical support was provided in the form of reli-
able sociological data—either by Bawulski or by me. Instead, I did what 
is customary for philosophers in defending claims that a particular view 
conforms to ordinary intuitions. I gave an argument contrived to elicit a 
certain intuitive reaction from the reader:
There are a number of situations in which we may judge the act of bring-
ing a new life in the world, or specifically, the procreative act itself, as be-
ing wrong. Consider, for starters, a couple who decides to conceive a child 
knowing there is a high probability that the child will be born with a terrible 
condition that will result in a short and terribly painful life—pain that is so 
bad that the child cannot even be picked up without exacerbating it. Assume 
also that this same couple would face a morally insignificant risk of giving 
birth to a child with this condition if the couple simply delays conception 
by a few years. Whether or not the child is born with the condition (but 
especially if he or she is), it is quite plausible to think (and nearly everyone 
I asked about this case took this position even while exhibiting sympathy 
for the parents) the parents committed a moral wrong—and one against the 
child—if they elected not to delay conception.10
If the reader rejects this argument because she has a different intuition 
about the relevant moral issue presented by the case, then she will not 
be persuaded by my argument. If, however, the reader shares my intu-
ition that conceiving a child under those circumstances is wrong, then she 
seems committed to some kind of principle that constrains the circum-
stances in which people can permissibly bring a new human life into the 
10“Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 188–189.
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world. Further, that principle will clearly take into account the severity of 
suffering to the child that will result if she is conceived and born.
Bawulski offers no serious challenge to my assumption that the 
intuition underlying NLP is one shared by ordinary mainstream Chris-
tians—despite the fact that, at the end of the day, this is the element of the 
argument most vulnerable to objection. He challenges NLP by claiming 
it has certain implications that Christians should reject but, apart from 
the fact that his reasoning is problematic, that does not, by itself, show 
Christians would reject those implications, as they might have intuitions 
different from those of Bawulski. What Bawulski does say about my claim 
that readers will share certain intuitions is overly brief; he simply opines 
that “Himma seems to regard NLP as representative of many if not most 
people’s moral intuitions.”11 He questions what he incorrectly thinks are 
implications of NLP but really never grapples with the cases that suggest 
some principle like NLP is true.
Of course, it is up to the reader to decide whether she has the same reac-
tion I do to the principal case on which I relied in BGM; however, I have 
not relied on just this case in this reply. Earlier in this essay, I gave a couple 
of other examples (and will give a few more below) in which I am, again, 
hypothesizing or predicting that the reader will share my reaction to at 
least one of them. These cases had to do with would-be parents who are 
not married bringing children into the world and with would-be parents 
bringing children into the world they know they cannot support—either 
financially or emotionally.
It is true, of course, that only one of these challenges is directly relevant. 
The first challenge to HKG was grounded in considerations of sexual mo-
rality, rather than considerations having to do with a child’s quality of 
life; accordingly, this challenge is not directly on point here—but it should 
weaken any presumptive resistance to some of my claims about HKG be-
cause it shows that HKG is not absolute. But the second challenge rested 
on an implicit principle that constrains the circumstances in which it is 
permissible to bring a child into the world on the basis of quality-of-life 
considerations. If the reader shares my reaction to either challenge, then she 
is committed to some principle that constrains the circumstances in which 
it is legitimate to bring a child into the world. But if the reader shares my 
reaction to the second—and more relevant—challenge, then she is com-
mitted to a principle, like NLP, that makes quality of life considerations 
relevant in determining whether it is permissible to bring a child into the 
world. And I suspect any potential principle that rules out bringing a child 
into the world on the basis of quality-of-life considerations—and I cannot 
ferret out and evaluate all the possibilities in a reply piece—will give me 
the result I think I have successfully established with my analysis.
Bawulski offers a second objection to NLP; as he elegantly expresses it,
11“Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 334.
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The second theological objection, perhaps the stronger, contends that  
Himma’s application of NLP to hell is misguided. It rejects a notion inher-
ent in Himma’s argument—that eternal punishment is for innocent victims 
who had the misfortune of having existence thrust upon them by their par-
ents. With NLP, the suffering in view comes “as a direct consequence of 
being born.” No respectable account of TDH posits reprobation as a direct 
result of being born. Being born does not decide the probability or actuality 
of one’s eternal destiny: some other factor does. . . . For defenders of TDH 
it is sin, not being born, that explains the suffering in hell. Also, for most 
defenders of TDH, the suffering in hell is linked to the agent’s liability for 
punishment (although the details of this linkage and liability vary).12
Bawulski argues that sinners have eternal suffering as their ultimate fate 
as a direct result of their free choices to transgress against God—and not as 
a direct result of birth: “Himma assumes that the suffering in eternal pun-
ishment is rightly analogous to the suffering and harm from things like 
a genetic disease, an environment horribly hostile to human flourishing 
with no likelihood of that changing (say, nuclear holocaust), or even the 
suffering that most people encounter in this life.”13 That is to say, Bawulski 
argues that NLP, if a valid moral principle, would not apply to birth be-
cause sin, and not birth, is the direct cause of the agent being consigned to 
hell upon death.
As it turns out, my statement of NLP lends itself naturally to such an 
interpretation because I used the term “consequence,” expressing NLP in 
terms of harms that will result as a consequence of being born. “Conse-
quence” is frequently used to pick out causal results, but I did not intend 
to express that idea for two good reasons: (1) it is clear that being born, by 
itself, does not cause consignment to hell; and (2) I do not think that NLP is 
limited in application to only direct causal results of being born. Indeed, I 
scrupulously avoided using the word “cause” to describe the relationship 
between being born and being consigned to hell; the only time I used it 
was in connection with acts creating risks, a causal claim that is compat-
ible with there being other external factors contributing as well.
Accordingly, a less misleading formulation of NLP—and one that cap-
tures only what I intended to capture by it—would be as follows:
NLP: It is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the world 
when would-be parents rationally believe there is a sufficiently high 
probability that their child would suffer some severe harm after birth 
that will endure for as long as she lives.
This principle should be understood as holding that if a significant risk 
of severe harm can knowingly be avoided only by abstinence or contra-
ception, two would-be parents would be committing a moral wrong by 
conceiving and having a child.
12Ibid., 337.
13Ibid.
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Here’s an example to make the idea intuitively plausible. Suppose, for 
whatever reason (perhaps God thunders it from the sky), that my wife 
and I know that if we conceive a child in the next two weeks, he or she will 
be kidnapped shortly after birth and tortured for three weeks and then 
killed painfully. It seems clear that we should refrain from conceiving 
for that two-week period—even if it means that the particular child who 
would have been born is never born because some other child is con-
ceived instead because conception occurs at a later time. The infant’s life 
in this case resembles the life of one born with a very painful terminal 
illness in all relevant respects. In both cases, the child’s life is short and 
untreatably painful.
Another example, if the reader is not convinced, might involve a situa-
tion where the probability of getting a highly infectious, painful, terminal 
virus is very high. If, for example, two people were spending a year in an 
area in which there was an epidemic of a deadly virus, it is clearly permis-
sible for that couple to abstain from conception for as long as they are in 
the area. Indeed, I suspect most of us would have some kind of negative 
moral reaction to a decision to conceive and give birth to a child in such 
a situation—especially if the child would surely die a painful death from 
the virus. But it is crucial to note that the child’s becoming infected with 
the virus is not the direct causal result of being born; it is the foresee-
able result of being contingently brought into other circumstances that 
exposed her to the virus. If the reader shares my intuition that it would 
be morally problematic to conceive under these circumstances, then she is 
committed to something like NLP.
Bawulski would reply that my argument overlooks that hell is a just 
consequence of unrepentant sinning. As he puts the point, “Questions 
about seemingly undeserved suffering are to be answered in a response to 
the problem of evil, not here. Himma’s argument flounders in that it fails 
to recognize this important feature of TDH as most defend it: it is just.”14 
On this view, then, NLP might sometimes apply to situations involving 
a substantial risk of undeserved harm or suffering, but not to a situation 
where the harm is deserved, such as occurs when people are justly con-
signed to hell.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to think that NLP would apply to sit-
uations presumably involving deserved suffering. Suppose, for example, 
that my wife and I know that any child we conceive within a specified 
two-week period will have a set of experiences that will culminate in the 
child’s committing acts, starting before he becomes an adult, that lead 
him to spend most of his life incarcerated under the worst conditions 
consistent with moral principles governing the conditions and terms of 
punishment—and these acts need not necessarily involve acts that harm 
other people, as there are plenty of laws criminalizing acts that harm only 
14Ibid., 338.
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the agent. My intuition is that it would be wrong for us to conceive a child 
during that two-week period.
One might think that my response to the case falsely assumes that the 
agent is not accountable for these acts, but this is mistaken. The concern 
would be that the example assumes that environment and genetics deter-
mine certain anti-social traits that condition the performance of anti-social 
acts for which the agent cannot be justly held accountable. But this is 
incorrect. Everyone assumes that a child’s environment has an effect on 
how the child’s character develops. This is why we take seriously the job 
of parenting: what we do as parents has a profound effect on what kind 
of persons our children become. But we nonetheless assume that per-
sons freely choose when acting on the basis of these character traits that 
profoundly influence them in deciding what to do. Although we believe 
environment can influence character and even decisions, we do not take 
this to imply we lack free will and are hence not accountable for our acts. 
Thus, the example and argument above assume nothing inconsistent with 
the idea that persons are morally accountable for their acts or with the 
idea that sometimes suffering is deserved.
II. Philosophical Objections
Bawulski also offers a number of insightful “philosophical” objections to 
my argument that birth is a grave misfortune from the standpoint of the 
fetus. My argument is grounded in a strategy for assessing and weighing 
certain risks and benefits associated with a person being born into this 
world. In particular, I argue that we lack adequate reason to believe that 
the probable benefits of being born outweigh the probable costs (i.e., con-
signment to hell) to justify subjecting a child to that risk by bringing her 
into the world.
One way to see the problem is to notice that, assuming an exclusivist 
doctrine from any tradition and TDH, simply being born subjects a person 
to the most hazardous test imaginable. If one of these traditional exclu-
sivist religions is correct, then a person must choose the right views about 
God, religion and ethics, as well as appropriately act on them. The problem 
is that none of the arguments for God’s existence or for the unique truth 
of some particular religious tradition is so persuasive that a person who 
does not accept these arguments is fairly characterized as being epistemi-
cally or morally culpable. From a purely prudential standpoint, I would 
prefer not to have been born if CSE and TDH are both true without my 
having some pretty clearly persuasive reason to think that (1) Christianity 
is true; (2) I will come to accept Christianity; and (3) I will do what is really 
necessary to be saved according to Christian doctrine. Indeed, I would re-
gard having been born as harmful if any of the exclusivist classical theistic 
religions subscribing to TDH is true—and a wrong committed against 
me if my parents understood the gravity of the risk to which I was being 
subjected. Insofar as my reasoning conforms to standards of practical 
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rationality applicable to all human beings, would-be parents should re-
frain from bringing children into the world.15
II.A. Does My Analysis Overstate the Probabilities?
The first, and most important, of the objections challenges my evaluation 
of the relevant probabilities in deciding whether to bring a child into the 
world. As Bawulski puts it:
Himma’s probability assignments are dubitable. . . . In Himma’s scheme, 
regarding the birth of a child, globally the probability of the “substantial 
harm” of hell is at best 2 in 3, probably higher; in geographic regions where 
Christianity is strong, it is perhaps 1 in 2. Yet certainly one can and should consider 
more factors, especially localized factors. The background information relevant to 
the probability of genuine Christian faith is vastly more extensive than the global or 
even regional believer/non-believer ratio: in fact, that ratio is virtually irrelevant.16
Bawulski’s concern here is that my reasoning is grounded in global prob-
abilities that do not apply to committed Christians and hence cannot 
support any conclusions about whether it is permissible for committed 
Christians to bring new children into the world.
Bawulski argues that my reasoning overstates the probability of con-
signment to hell for children born to parents who are committed Christians:
What is the probability of reprobation for the potential child of would-be 
parents who are deeply committed Christians, actively involved in a thriv-
ing local church, who have a stable and functional marriage and home life 
as well as a healthy spiritual life, and who fully intend to raise their child in 
the way that best encourages and facilitates both assent to the truth of the 
core doctrines of Christianity and the lifelong exercising of genuinely saving 
faith? . . . I should think that in this type of situation the probability would 
be quite low, even if we have uncertainty as to what exactly constitutes genuinely 
saving Christian faith.17
There are a number of problems here. To begin, it is not clear, assuming 
the truth of other premises in his argument, that consideration of the local 
probabilities would justify bringing a child into the world. When cata-
strophic outcomes are involved in a choice-situation, they are not always 
weighed against desirable outcomes in the way costs and benefits are 
weighed in more typical decisions involving ordinary harms and benefits. 
Consider, for example, a game of Russian Roulette in which the mag-
nitude of what is won or lost is much greater than ordinary harms and 
ordinary benefits. The cost of losing is, of course, death—the end of life. 
Suppose the prize for winning amounts to all the things you want most 
15These propositions also have important implications for the question of whether abor-
tion should, from the standpoint of Christianity, be legally permitted—even if abortion is 
murder. On this question, see Himma, “No Harm, No Foul,” 172–194.
16“Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 339 (emphasis 
mine).
17Ibid. (emphasis in original).
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for yourself; depending on your values the prizes might include money, 
fame, happiness, achievement, etc. My intuition is that, no matter how 
good the prize might be, a five-in-six chance of avoiding the catastrophic 
outcome of death is not large enough to warrant my playing. Further, I 
think that it would be morally wrong to try to persuade another person to 
play Russian Roulette under those conditions. If the odds of winning were 
5,999,999,999 to 1, then I would play—and might even make some kind 
of argument that someone else should play, although I could not do even 
that without some moral reservations.18
The problem here is that consignment to eternal torment is as cata-
strophic an outcome as is possible for any person from the standpoint of 
prudential rationality. If I were temporarily given rationality while in the 
womb and were informed of the relevant epistemic probabilities of the 
potential risks and rewards of being born, I would choose not to be born 
even if the chances of eternal bliss are 5 out of 6 and eternal torment just 1 
out of 6. While it might be true that eternal bliss is as positive an outcome 
as is possible from the standpoint of prudential rationality, I would be no 
more willing to play Heavenly Roulette with a 5 in 6 chance of winning 
than I would be to play Russian Roulette with those odds—no matter how 
desirable the prize is.
The specific probability I chose for the example was not a matter of 
happenstance; 5 in 6 odds of winning translate into a .83 probability of 
winning or an 83.3 percent chance of winning. In this connection, it is 
especially worth noting that a recent study in the sociology of religion 
shows that approximately 82 percent of adolescents with religious par-
ents tend to be as active and committed as their parents to the relevant 
religious views; in other words, the probability that two Christian parents 
raise a child to have—during the period of her adolescence and continuing well 
into her twenties—the same beliefs and commitments that a parent has 
is about 82 percent.19 But if it is prudentially irrational to choose to play 
either game of roulette described above with a .82 probability of winning, 
it would be prudentially irrational to choose to be brought into the world 
even if one knows—for the purpose of making the decision only—that one 
will be born to Christian parents and that there is an 82 percent chance of 
winning and for the same reason: the cost of a loss is so catastrophic that 
it warrants giving up a significantly greater chance of winning the best 
possible prize. And insofar as it is prudentially irrational for a person to 
choose birth in this choice-situation, it seems morally wrong to bring that 
person into the world (thereby inflicting on him what is irrational for him 
18One runs a bigger risk of death simply by going to work—whether by car, bicycle or 
foot. It would, of course, be silly to avoid that risk by staying home because the probable 
costs of losing one’s job would vastly exceed the probable benefits of the reduced death risk. 
If so, the same reasoning would apply to Russian roulette once the odds of losing became 
small enough.
19See, e.g., Briggs, “Parents No. 1 Influence Helping Teens Remain Religiously Active as 
Young Adults.” 
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to choose for himself). After all, children are being brought into a difficult 
world without their consent.
It might be true that many Christians would not share my precise 
intuitions on these cases, but that does not matter. First, I doubt there 
is a persuasive argument that my reactions to the two cases above are 
prudentially irrational; surely, it is not prudentially irrational to choose 
non-existence with no rewards or punishment over an option that has a 
theoretically significant probability of producing a catastrophically bad 
outcome. Second, it is one thing not to share my strong intuition that non-
existence is the more prudentially rational choice; but it is another entirely 
to have a strong intuition that existence is the more prudentially rational 
option. This is also an empirical issue, but I would be surprised if many 
people had a strong intuition that existence is the better choice here.
Further, Bawulski overestimates the ability of Christian parents to min-
imize the risk that the children they bring into the world will be consigned 
to eternal torment. Bawulski’s view is strikingly optimistic with respect 
to the permissibility of Christians bringing new children into the world. 
He argues that “legions” of highly devout Christians can justifiably bring 
a child into the world because they, “by even a more strict account of sal-
vation requirements, would almost universally be recognized as among 
those who ought to be regarded as having genuinely saving Christian 
faith.”20 Such highly devout Christians are justified in bringing a child into 
the world, on this reasoning, because they would impart to their child the 
“even more strict account of salvation,” ensuring that they, too, “would . . . 
be recognized as among those who ought to be regarded as having genu-
inely saving Christian faith.” At bottom, the argument here is that devout 
Christians can circumvent what epistemic uncertainty there is about what 
is needed for salvation by adopting—and imparting to their children—a 
sufficiently strict account of the requirements for being spared an eternity 
of torments.
To begin, it is worth noting that this is an argument that will work only 
on the assumption that Christianity is the correct religion. In the absence 
of that assumption, there is no reason whatsoever to think that legions of 
Christians can feel confident that they will produce children who will be 
saved; if exclusivist Islam is true, those children will be consigned to hell. 
Of course, one of the features of the world that makes birth so hazardous 
is that we lack persuasive reason to think either that an all-perfect God 
exists or that Christianity (or any religion) is uniquely true—which means 
that Bawulski’s argument is very limited with respect to what work it can 
do, if any.
In addition, what a sufficiently “strict” account of salvation would re-
quire as a prerequisite for salvation is not clear. Loving Jesus is clearly a 
prerequisite for salvation on any mainstream view, but Jesus is clear that 
keeping his commandments is part of what it takes to “love” Jesus (John 
20“Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 339.
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14:15)—and one of his commandments is, of course, the command to 
love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. Although it is not clear how this 
commandment is correctly interpreted, one might interpret it, as a means 
of teaching a more strict account of salvation, as requiring much greater 
sacrifices than most traditional Christians believe is necessary or even 
doable. One reason to think it is easier for a camel to pass through a needle 
than for a rich man to enter heaven is that the rich man has discretionary 
income that was not used to relieve suffering to the extent required by 
the command to love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. If so, teaching a 
more strict account of salvation—and the danger here is especially tragic if 
it is not the correct account—could actually discourage faith by demoral-
izing the child to whom this is taught. There are, thus, two problems with 
Bawulski’s argument that Christians who satisfy a more strict account of 
salvation and hence have genuine saving Christian faith could lower the 
probability of a child’s being consigned to hell by teaching her that ac-
count of salvation: (1) we do not really have any idea of what a sufficiently 
strict account of salvation might require; and (2) teaching an account that 
is stricter than the correct account of salvation might make it less likely 
that she accept Christianity if it seems implausibly or demoralizingly 
strict to her.
II.B. Counterexamples to NLP?
Bawulski argues, further, that NLP cuts too broadly, prohibiting procre-
ation in situations in which it is intuitively permissible, and offers what he 
takes to be counterexamples to NLP:
Consider cases of potential parents in areas of the world where war, starva-
tion, disease, etc. are prevalent, or any situation where there is a high epis-
temic probability of a child suffering in this life. NLP would seemingly rule 
out procreation in these cases (again, apart from TDH, exclusivism, or any 
consideration beyond just this life). On Himma’s account, procreation would 
be morally impermissible for poor married couples, for anyone living in im-
poverished communities, and even for some entire nations (indeed, as noted 
above, Himma says as much). I suspect many would share my discomfort 
with this implication.21
The claim here seems to be that NLP rules out procreation in cases where, 
according to ordinary intuitions (Bawulksi talks in terms of “discomfort”), 
it is permissible.
Assuming that Bawulski is correct in suggesting that NLP should not 
apply in such cases to prohibit procreation, the problem he points to can 
be avoided simply by reformulating the notion of “severe harm” in NLP 
so that it does not apply to such cases. One plausible way to do this is to 
define the harm that triggers application of NLP as one no practically ra-
tional person would be willing to risk for herself. The torments of hell are 
so severe that one has to question the rationality of someone who would 
21Ibid., 340–341.
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willingly do something that she believes incurs a substantial risk—one that 
cannot be counterbalanced by some good the act produces—of the kind 
of suffering involved in eternal torment. It is one thing for a person not 
to believe that hell exists as a punishment or to have significant doubts 
about its existence. It is another thing entirely for that person to believe 
that hell exists as a divine punishment but not deploy that belief to con-
strain what she does in this world; someone who simply does not care 
at all whether hell exists or whether she might go there is practically ir-
rational. This is not true of any of the examples that Bawulksi cites in his 
counterargument above.
Nevertheless, it is not as clear as Bawulski believes that NLP should not 
apply to these cases. Do we really think it is not morally wrong to bring a 
child into the middle of a war zone when the parents have no reason to 
think the war will come to a timely end and have good reason to think 
that the child might be killed or maimed for life? Do we really think it is 
not morally wrong for people who cannot feed their children because they 
live in absolute poverty to bring a child into the world when that child 
faces a high probability of a painful death from malnutrition? One can 
certainly bite the bullet and take that position for theoretical purposes, 
but that accomplishes nothing. If one really believes, as I do intuitively, 
that it is wrong to bring a child into the world under those circum-
stances, then one is really committed, assuming the rest of the argument 
holds up to scrutiny, to rejecting either TDH or Christian exclusivism—
both of which, as far as I am concerned, paint God as arbitrary, cruel, 
and barbaric.22
Conclusions
I do not believe, and have not argued, that it is morally wrong, as a general 
matter, for anyone to bring children in the world—unless we are in danger 
of overpopulation or the mother is young and cannot provide for the child 
or the child has a substantial risk of some severe disease or disability. 
But I have argued that the conjunction of NLP, CSE, and TDH entail it is 
morally wrong for anyone to have children—and that either CSE or TDH 
should be rejected. Of course, one can always bite the bullet and give up 
the ordinary moral intuitions that I think are expressed by NLP; however, 
the more reasonable response is to give up one of the other views, which 
cause so many philosophical problems that they seem far less reliable than 
22Bawulski believes that my argument presupposes that consequentialism is true (“Do 
Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 342). It is true that I weigh 
costs and benefits, but that is not inconsistent with NLP being grounded in a deontological 
moral theory. It might help to note here that NLP does not say it is wrong to bring a child into 
the world if it does not maximize utility; it says it is wrong to bring a child into the world if 
the disutilities reach a very high threshold. That is not consistent with act-utilitarianism; and 
it is no more consistent with a rule-utilitarian theory (which strikes me as not really being 
consequentialist in character) than with a deontological theory. 
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the intuitions expressed in NLP. But I cannot even begin to defend that 
point here.23
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